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John Kelgler, Chairman
RCA Astro-Electronlcs Division
Larry Rowell, Cochalrman
NASA Langley Research Center
The Spacecraft Systems Group of the Spacecraft 2000 Workshop
convened on the afternoon of Tuesday, 29 July 1986. Sessions
were held that afternoon, and Wednesday all day and evening.
Findings
morning
Thursday
Subsystem Groups, and
Steering Committee.
and
Plenary Session.
afternoon to
recommendations were presented at
A follow-up session
incorporate findings of
to
the Thursday
was held on
the various
make further recommendations to the
The Spacecraft Systems Group was extremely large, consisting of
twenty-eight members, including several members of the Steering
Committee, who sat in on nearly all of the sessions. Dr. Jack
Keigler, of
Larry Rowell
The members
A.
RCA Astro Electronics Division, was Chairman, and
of NASA - Langley Research Center was Co-Chairman.
participating in the group are listed in Attachment
The discussions were wide-ranging, reflecting the breadth of
experience in the membership. Nevertheless, the group focused
on the objectives of the workshop and on the issues assigned
specifically to the Spacecraft Systems Group.
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WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES
TO
FOR
IDENTIFY THE CRITICAL NEEDS AND TECHNOLOGIES
SPACECRAFT OF THE 21ST CENTURY, AND TO
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND
VALIDATION PROGRAMS AND POSSIBLE
AND INDUSTRIAL ROLES AND
RECOMMEND
IN-SPACE
GOVERNMENT
PARTNERSHIPS.
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE OF THE SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS GROUP
DETERMINE METHODOLOGY & GROUND RULES FOR
SELECTION OF DESIGN CONCEPTS AND TECHNOLOGIES
ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE GROUP
o Definition
function
of user/comme r c i al/gover nmen t needs by
- Criteria for prioritization of needs
o Overall criteria for technology
prioritization of needs
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assessment,
o System configuration drivers
- Key trade studies - mass, life, power, cost,
performance, etc.
o Space infrastructure interface
o Cost Drivers
- Pros & cons of standardization
- Manufacturing test serviceability supportability
Ground rules announced at the initial Plenary Session were
adhered to by the group while pursuing its objectives. These
were that recommendations should:
o Exclude STS, SPACE STATION, and other payloads
solutions to the SPACECRAFT2000 objective.
as
Be independent of the SPACE STATION and OMV/OTV
o Provide technology payoff by the year 2000
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As a
were
These
for
result of the Tuesday afternoon session, several viewfoils
prepared and presented at the Wednesday morning plenary.
focused on the objectives, approach, methodology, criteria
technology assessment and prioritization, and mission
drivers.
The
in
the
working sessions of Wednesday afternoon and evening resulted
a refined set of thirteen viewfoils, which were presented at
final plenary on Thursday. These are introduced as Charts 1
through 12 in the text that follows.
Based on the objectives and ground rules, Chart i, the group
arrived at a consensus that the methodology should provide
credible, quantified models for mission, costs, and
reliability/availability upon which a technology assessment for
enhanced payload mass fraction could be made. There was general
agreement that reduced mass fraction of the spacecraft bus would
enable a nearly one-to-one increase in payload mass fraction,
and that most savings would be realized by improvements in
propulsion, power, and structure/thermal technology. This
viewpoint was presented in Chart 2.
A system methodology was developed by which a technology ranking
could be accomplished, and presented as Chart 3. Mission models
and requirements for future Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Geostationary
Earth Orbit (GEO) and Planetary missions would first be
developed. From this effort, general Systems and Subsystems
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requirements would be defined for each mission category, and
criteria for measurements of performance developed and utilized
for prioritization. A cost and availability model would then be
run for each mission to assess servicing, repairability,
maintainability and operations considerations. This model must
be fully developed, based on existing cost and availability
models. Findings of the other spacecraft 2000 working groups
could then be assessed against model results, with particular
attention to the high pay-off subsystems. An iteration would
result in a technology ranking which could then be used to
prioritize technology experiments.
Transportation costs as a percentage of total system cost are
not expected to change by the year 2000 due to the interacting
effects of competition, technology improvements, fuel specific
impulse increases, insurance costs, and increased reliability
and safety requirements. Chart 4 therefore makes the point that
increases in payload capability requires improvement in the
technology and associated costs for the Spacecraft Bus and for
the Operations and Maintenance functions.
Much discussion
associated cost
as the "missing
centered on the mission operations tasks and
drivers. Chart 5 describes mission operations
subsystem", and defines its functions and what
it does. Increases in spacecraft autonomy and reliability-
availability would reduce operations and maintenance costs, and
are therefore believed to be of equal importance to that of
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reducing spacecraft bus weight. Chart 6 was developed from an
effort to identify the most important criteria for technology
assessment and prioritization of needs. The five most important
needs were identified, and relative weighting factors assigned
based on general agreement of the membership. Reduction of
Bus weight and reduction of operations and
costs were considered equally important, and for the
comparison, assigned a weighting factor of 10. As
stated, technology increases in these areas will
directly result in bigger payloads, with associated reductions
in overall cost - a "bigger bang for the buck" in terms of
payload capability in space.
Spacecraft
maintenance
purpose of
previously
Discussions
Spacecraft
lighter
subsystems,
synergism
management,
of the group resulted in agreement that reduction in
Bus weight will be most easily attained by better,
propulsion subsystems (and propellants), power
and structural/thermal subsystems. Increased
between subsystems will allow more streamlined data
fewer sensors, lighter structure and reduced power.
attitude control might also be
and for alignment of a large
For example, sensors used for
used as reference for payloads
flexible structure.
Reduction of
fallouts of
availability.
with each
operations and maintenance costs will be natural
increased spacecraft autonomy and reliability/
Spacecraft subsystems are gaining more autonomy
new program, but true autonomy is many years away
9O
unless a
subsystems.
reduce the
particularly
require far
concerted effort is made to develop fault tolerant
Then there must also be a concerted effort to
huge number of operations personnel now in place,
for military spacecraft. Geosynchronous satellites
fewer people now, because the tasks of tracking,
command loading, and pointing are straight forward and require
only one station once in orbit. The major targets for
autonomous subsystem development are low earth orbit satellites
and, to a lesser degree, interplanetary spacecraft. Autonomous
navigation subsystems which would automatically determine orbit
parameters, accomplish pointing of the spacecraft and/or its
payloads, and maintain structural alignments, would greatly
reduce ground operations manpower.
A reduction of number and bandwidth of data links between the
space and ground will be partially accomplished by improving
spacecraft autonomy. A far greater savings would be realized by
more extensive onboard processing of payload data. While data
compression techniques have been developed to some extent, the
tendency to collect, down-link, and process all data persists.
Onboard processing would also reduce operations and maintenance
costs, previously targeted as one of the highest priority items.
A weighting factor of only 7 was agreed upon because a reduction
in number and bandwidth of data links will eventually become a
necessity as the available spectrum becomes saturated. This in
turn will force more and more onboard processing into spacecraft
design.
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Standardization of subsystems and interfaces would add greatly
to savings in cost while improving reliability/availability.
Connectors, processors and software, thrusters, sensors,
batteries, etc., currently are of different design for every
line of spacecraft. Much of this is because of competition
between many spacecraft contractors and vendors. Although
competition breeds improvements in quality and technology,
there is a feeling that standardization can and should be
accomplished whenever possible, and that studies should be made
to determine the best way of accomplishing the goal. The
provisions for using standardized subsystems, components, and
interfaces could be imposed by government specifications and the
statement of work for each new program. This was given a
weighting factor of 5 when compared to other criteria.
Reduced
criteria,
agreed upon because
many incentives to
spacecraft design,
techniques.
costs of manufacturing and test is considered a given
with a weighting factor of 3. This lower factor was
there has been and should continue to be
accomplish the goal through innovative
and efficient manufacturing and test
Mission drivers to technology needs were categorized by mission
type and launch/injection technique as shown in Chart 7. The
mission types; Planetary, GEO or LEO, each have demands and
criticality levels that are different in terms of technology
issues. Chart 8 is the result of the Spacecraft Systems Group
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attempt to identify the importance of technology issues in each
mission category. It stands alone in terms of generally
identifying critical needs. However, much more intensive study
is needed to quantify these needs as a basis for prioritizing
technology development.
The National Space Needs summarized in Chart 9 are the result of
evaluating the general technology issues, cost drivers, and
polling the members of the panel. Of primary importance is the
recognition that space assets needed for technology development
have diminished over the past ten years because of reduced R&D
budgets. Technology Development spacecraft, such as ATS and
NIMBUS, no longer exist: virtually every program now focuses on
current needs, not future needs. It was a strong opinion of the
group that only orbital test platforms, dedicated to technology
advancement, would enable and validate new technology.
Experiments to develop advanced large structures, attitude
control subsystems and other subsystems can not possibly be
conducted to the extent required on STS, on the Space Station
or as piggyback on operational satellites because of the mutual
impact between the experiment and host.
Certainly the kinds of technology development that are needed
will require ground development and testing and much can be
accomplished with the Space Station and STS, but only an orbital
platform (or platforms)
development needed.
will enable the required total
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The
orbital test
10, further
Enhancing.
group compiled a list of candidate developments that an
bed should be used for. These are listed in Chart
classified as Technology Enabling or Technology
Many were independently suggested by the various
Subsystem Groups.
The characteristics of a Spacecraft 2000 were developed by the
group and presented in Chart ii. These characteristics can be
achieved by the deliberate, dedicated and funded technology
development program recommended by the Spacecraft 2000 Workshop.
Recommendations
in Chart 12.
level analysis
tools would be
technology ranking
developments
development,
of the Spacecraft Systems Group are summarized
The first recommendation is to develop system
tools to assess subsystem technologies. These
used in conjunction with the methodology for
previously discussed (Chart 3). Those
selected could then be the subject of funded
first with ground development and test, and then
for development in space. Priority would be given to those
identified as having the highest performance and cost benefits.
The second
development
Program for
should encompass
independent
recommendation
of a
the
one
satellites
of the group is that NASA lead the
flexible, multidisciplinary Orbital Test Bed
basic reasons listed on the chart. Test Beds
or more platforms which could be
or the Shuttle. Development experiments
and tests would be systematically manifested onto and off of the
test beds emphasizing co-utilization with compatible payloads.
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On Thursday afternoon,
assess recommendations
morning plenary. It
the Spacecraft Systems group met to
by the Subsystem Groups delivered at the
was agreed that their recommendations
generally
Likewise
believes
must first
selection.
supported those of the Spacecraft Systems Group.
the group concurred with Subsystem recommendations, but
that design concepts and technology development program
be well defined for prioritization and subsequent
The methodology and ground rules have been generally outlined in
this report and must be further developed. The selection
process also requires development of adequate models to define
costs, servicing, repairability, maintainability and operations
characteristics.
Recommendations to the Steering Committee were:
i) NASA should solicit from industry and universities
proposals for funded definition of in-space technology
experiments. NASA Langley Research Center volunteered
to perform this solicitation for proposals.
2) A
develop in
to be used
experiments.
separate solicitation should be made for proposals to
parallel the required system analysis tools
for evaluating and ranking of the proposed
95
Two 3-5 month (2-3 man-years) studies were recommended:
o Develop a mission model (updated) which
derives system and subsystem requirements
that are then grouped into common technical
(quantitative) requirements.
o Develop cost and availability models
(decision criteria) for technology
assessment.
One study (3-4 month),
also recommended:
perhaps by NASA in-house, was
o Introduce discipline technology trade-offs
into two above models to determine ranking.
At the end of these parallel studies, models should be
exposed to industry review and critique.
NASA-HQ-OAST probably should
select the best contractor.
lead this effort and
3) After (i) and (2) are accomplished, an RFP should be
issued to obtain the most suitable contractor to
evaluate the proposed experiments based on the models
and to provide a technology ranking OAST or NASA/LeRC
could lead this effort.
96
4) Funded development of various experiments should then
be accomplished on a competitive basis and contractors
selected to define and construct the orbital test bed
platforms, integrate and operate experiments, and
provide launch capability and services.
These recommendations were given to the Steering Committee on
the afternoon of 31 July 1986 and the Spacecraft Systems Group
adjourned.
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ATTACHMENT A
SPACECRAFT 2000 WORKSHOP
SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS CROUP MEMBERSHIP
NAME COMPANY/ADDRESS PHONE
Jack Keigler
(Chairman)
RCA Astro Electronics 609-426-2848
Larry Rowell
(Co-Chairman)
NASA Langley Research Center
Mail Stop 364
Hampton, VA 23692
804-865-4983
Ray Hallett GE Space Systems Division
Valley Forge, PA
215-354-2370
William Wolfe GE Space Systems Division
Valley Forge, PA
215-962-6668
Nell Barberis Ford Aerospace
Palo Alto, CA 94033
415-852-6194
Steve Garrity LMSC
Sunnyvale, CA
408-756-5514
Bob Brodsky TRW Space & Technology
EI/3006
One Space Park
Redondo Beach, CA 90278
213-376-7557
Hank Hyans Ford Aerospace & Comm.
WDL Division
415-852-6806
Stuart Fordyce NASA Lewis Research Center
MS 3-5
Cleveland, OH 44135
216-433-2962
Dan Raymer Aerojet Propulsion
Research Institute
916-355-2359
Karl A. Faymon NASA Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, OH
216-433-6150
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NAME COMPANY/ADDRESS PHONE
Anthony Ratajczak NASA Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, OH
216-433-2225
David L. Pankopf Rockwell International
Satellite Systems Division
Mail Code SL 55
Seal Beach, CA
213-594-1834
F. J. Randolph JPL
Pasadena, CA
818-354-4454
Vernon R. Larson Rockwell - Rocketdyme
Canoga Park, CA
818-700-3216
Ronald C. Cull 2302 Streckon Rd.
Milan, OH 44846
419-499-2863
David L. Younkin TRW, S & TG
One Space Park
Redondo Beach, CA 90278
218-536-4658
Douglas A. Rohn NASA Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, OH
216-433-3325
Larry Kruse NASA
CM-CIO-2
Kennedy Space Center
Cape Canaveral, FL
305-853-5076
Jay Brown Fairchild Space Co.
Germantown, MD
301-428-6860
Bruce W. Larsen NASA - PT - FPO
Kennedy Space Center
Cape Canaveral, FL
305-867-2780
David Snyder NASA Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, OH
216-433-2217
Paul Schrantz Comsat Labs 301-428-4453
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NAME COMPANY/ADDRESS PHONE
Gene Pawlik NASA - Headquarters 202-453-2755
Jim Darcy RCA Astro Electronics 609-426-2359
Whitt Brantley NASA - MSFC
PD 14
205-544-0480
Vernon R. Larson Rockwell - Rocketdyne 818-700-3216
W. Eckstrom Ball Aerospace 303-939-4855
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SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS GROUP
OBJECTIVE
GROUND RULES
DETERMINE METHODOLOGY AND GROUND
RULES FOR SELECTION OF DESIGN
CONCEPTS AND TECHNOLOGIES
• EXCLUDE STS, SPACE STATION, PAYLOADS
• INDEPENDENT OF SPACE STATION & OMV / OTV
• TECHNOLOGY PAYOFF BY YEAR 2000
CHART 01
SYSTEMS METHODOLOGY
• CREDIBLE, QUANTIFIED MODELS FOR
MISSIONS
COSTS
RELIABILITY / AVAILABILITY
• TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT FOR ENHANCED PAYLOAD
MASS FRACTION
PROPULSION
POWER
STRUCTURE / THERMAL
CHART 02
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CHART 03
SYSTEM COST DRIVERS
CURRENT TECHNOLOGY
J
CHART 04
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S/C 2000 TECHNOLOGY
MISSION OPERATIONS -
THE "MISSING SUBSYSTEM"
WHAT IS IT ?
• THE SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE NEEDED TO OPERATE AND CONTROL
SPACE SYSTEMS
• A SUPER SUBSYSTEM CONSISTING OF MANY GROUND AND SPACE
ELEMENTS PLUS COMMUNICATIONS LINKS
WHAT IT DOES.
e SUBSYSTEM INTEGRATION
e COMMAND AND CONTROL INTERFACES
o RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
e FAULT MANAGEMENT
e USER INTERFACES
e SERVICING SUPPORT
CHART 05
CRITERIA FOR TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
AND PRIORITIZATION OF NEEDS
• REDUCTION OF SIC BUS WEIGHT
• PROPULSION, POWER, STRUCTURE
• SYNERGISM (SUBSYSTEM)
0 REDUCTION OF OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE COSTS
• INCREASED SIC AUTONOMY
• INCREASED RELIABILITY I AVAILABILITY
0 REDUCTION OF DATA LINK DEMANDS
• ON - BOARD PROCESSING
e STANDARDIZATION OF SUBSYSTEMS AND INTERFACES
• INCLUDING SOFTWARE
0 REDUCED COST OF MANUFACTURING AND TEST
CHART 06
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WEIGHTING
FACTOR
10
10
MISSION DRIVERS TO TECHNOLOGY NEEDS
MISSION TYPE
• LEO
• GEO
• PLANETARY
LAUNCH AND INJECTION TECHNIQUE
ELV VS SHUTTLE
SPACE STATION VS DIRECT
GROUND VS IN - SPACE ASSEMBLY
CHART 07
CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY AREAS
TECHNOLOGY
ISSUES
CRITERIA PLANETARY
WEIGHT
OPERATION
OR
MAINTENANCE
DATA
INTERFACES
&
STANDARDS
GENERIC MISSION CATEGORIES
• MOST CRITICAL
I0 HI AUTONOMY DEMAND
• EXPERT SYSTEM DRIVER
• ALLOCATE FUNCTION TO
SOFTWARE
• IN SPACE LINKS NEEDED
• NOT CRITICAL
GEO
, CRITICAL
= REDUCE GROUND
DEPENDENCY
= SMART SOFTWARE
FOR TELEOPERATIO_
I INTERFERENCE FROM
MULTIPLE USERS
i STANDARDS FORSERVICINGON- ORBIT
MAINTENANCE
STANDARDS
LEO
• LEAST CRITICAL
• REDUCE GROUND
DEPENDENCY
• USE SOFTWARE TO
RELIEVE MAN
• BANDWIDTH DRIVER
• ON BOARD DATA
REDUCTION REQUIRED
• MODULAR SUBSYSTEM_
• MAN & MACHINE
INTERFACE
STANDARDS
• ON-ORBIT
MAINTENANCE
STANDARDS
CHART 08
1 OF2
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CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY AREAS
TECHNOLOGY GENERIC MISSION CATEGORIES
ISSUES
CRITERIA PLANETARY GEO LEO
REPAIR • SELF - REPAIR • TELEROBOTICS • DESIGN TOOLS FOR
• TREND ANALYSIS SUPPORT ABILITY
• MAN SUPERVISE I MACHINE
DO
ENVIRONMENTS
INDUCED
NATURAL
• AVIOD • AVIOD • IN SITU SERVICING
CONTAMINATION
OF SUBJECT
• HI LOADS/SOLAR
AREA
CONTAMINATION
OF INSTRUMENTS
• EMI
DOCKING
CONTAMINATION
DEBRIS
MATERIALS / ATOMIC
OXYGEN
POLAR PLASMA / EMI
CHART 08
2 OF2
NATIONAL SPACE NEEDS
o LOW COST, RELIABLE TRANSPORTATION
• SYSTEM COST DRIVER
• ORBITAL TEST PLATFORMS
• ENABLE NEW TECHNOLOGY
• VALIDATE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
• LOW COST, LONG LIFE SPACECRAFT
• MODULAR STANDARD INTERFACES
, AUTONOMOUS OPERATION
• REPAIRABLE / SERVICEABLE
CHART 09
]05
TEST BED UTILIZATION
TECHNOLOGY ENABLING TECHNOLOGY ENHANCING
HEAT PIPE / THERMAL STORAGE
TETHERED POWER / PROPULSION
EXPERIMENTS
CONTROL OF LARGE STRUCTURES
TELEROBOTICS DEMONSTRATIONS
CONTAMINATION STUDIES
CRITICAL CLEANING
ENVIRONMENTAL INTERACTIONS
TWO- PHASE FLUID PHENOMENA
CRYO REFRIGERATORS
CHART 10
LARGE DIAMETER N 2 0 2 DIAPHRAMS
ELECTRIC PROPULSION DEVICES
ADVANCED BATTERIES
ADVANCED STELLAR SENSORS
(< 1 ARC SEC)
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM DEMOS
NUCLEAR POWER SUPPLY HANDLING
NEW SOLAR CELLS
HIGH POWER ELECTRICAL
DISTRIBUTION & SWITCHING
SPACECRAFT 2000 SYSTEM
CHARACTERISTICS
MODULAR CONSTRUCTION / STANDARD INTERFACES
• INTERCHANGEABLE / REPAIRABLE
• UPGRADEABLE
• DEVELOPMENT COSTS REDUCED
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS
REPAIRABLE / SERVICEABLE
REDUCED OPERATIONS COSTS
FAULT DETECTION / ISOLATION
RECONFIGURATION
REDUCED DATA LINK LOADS
SUBSYSTEMS
INCREASED SPACECRAFT LIFE
REDUCED CONSUMABLES MASS
RECONFIGURABLE HARDWARE
CHART 11
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RECOMMENDATIONS & BENEFITS
DEVELOP SYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSIS TOOLS FOR SUBSYSTEM
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
• EARLIEST IDENTIFICATION OF THE HIGHEST PERFORMANCE
AND COST BENEFITS
DEVELOP A FLEXIBLE, MULTIDISCIPLINARY ORBITAL TEST BED
CAPABILITY
• TECHNOLOGY RISK REDUCTION
• INSTILL NEW MOMENTUM IN TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
• ENCOURAGE COMMERICAL VIABILITY
• PROVIDE UNITED STATES SPACE TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP
CHART 12
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